		SUPERIOR COURT
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2	Anne M. Chapman, 025965	2010 JUL 15 PM 4:41
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11	Attorneys for Defendant	
11	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF	THE STATE OF ARIZONA
12	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF YAVAPAI	
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14	STATE OF ARIZONA,) No. P1300CR20081339
İ	Plaintiff,) Div. 6
15	i idiitiii,)
16	vs.) DEFENSE POSITION ON
17) HARTFORD EVIDENCE AND
	STEVEN CARROLL DEMOCKER,) POSSIBLE STIPULATION
18	Defendant.) }
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20)
21) UNDER SEAL
22	Steven DeMocker, by and through counsel, respectfully provides the Court with	
23	his position regarding a possible stipulation regarding Hartford Insurance. This request	
24	is based on the due process clause, the Eighth Amendment and Arizona counterparts,	
25	Arizona Rules of Evidence, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and the following	
26	Memorandum of Points and Authorities.	
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DIVISION 6

I. THE HARTFORD INSURANCE INFORMATION ABOUT HOW, WHAT AMOUNT AND FOR WHAT PURPOSE THE BENEFITS WERE PAID SHOULD BE PRECLUDED ON GROUNDS OF ARIZONA RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND ARIZONA RULES OF EVIDENCE

Since July 1, the State has late disclosed over 1100 pages of documents and 16 witnesses related to the payout of the Hartford Life Insurance policies, including Mr. DeMocker's counsel John Sears. The Court has properly determined that Mr. Sears is not a necessary witness. The State failed to comply with Rule 15.6 (b) by providing timely notice and did not exercise the required due diligence required under Rule 15.6(d). The Court can and should preclude all late disclosed witnesses and documents under Rule 15.6.

Similarly, the facts about how the insurance benefits were ultimately transferred (through the estate, the trust, to Mr. DeMocker's daughters, to Mr. DeMocker's parents and Mr. DeMocker's counsel), how much was transferred and for what purpose the money was used is not relevant to any fact at issue in this trial. These witnesses and documents should be precluded under Rule 401 and 402. If the Court does determine, over the defense objection, that this information is relevant, the prejudice and potential for confusion to Mr. DeMocker far outweighs whatever minimal probative value of this information. Counsel are particularly concerned that the State intends to disclose the amount of money transferred to support Mr. DeMocker's defense. Disclosing the fact that \$700,000 was paid to counsel will have an extremely prejudicial effect on Mr. DeMocker. Counsel know from previously received juror notes that jurors have been discussing the high cost of Mr. DeMocker's bike and other issues related to his relative income level. For two years now, the press and bloggers have seen fit to smear Mr. DeMocker as a profligate man of wealth—as if his financial profile were proof of guilt. This information is not relevant and is prejudicial.

Lastly, these issues should be precluded based on Rule 404(b). The State is offering this evidence to impugn Mr. DeMocker's character and the character of his counsel and family. The evidence is not relevant to motive. How the money was paid, the amount of money paid to defense counsel, and the purpose of the money adds nothing to what Mr. DeMocker's motive might have been prior to Carol Kennedy's murder. For this reason, the evidence is not offered to prove motive and should be precluded based on Rule 404(b).

The Court raised the issue of the absence of surprise to the defense that the Hartford Insurance policies are relevant. While it is true that the fact of these policies is not a surprise to the defense, it is a complete surprise to the defense that the State would misrepresent to the jury that Mr. DeMocker sought the insurance proceeds for himself, as if the State was not aware that Mr. DeMocker was seeking to disclaim his benefits to his daughters. Furthermore, while the issue of avoiding surprise is one purpose of the Rule, the focus and plain language of the Rule to determine whether late disclosure is admissible, is the State's due diligence. The State's untenable position apparently was that it had no duty to inquire of Hartford between 2008 and the date of trial even though it knew that Mr. DeMocker was seeking to disclaim his benefits and even though the State was in contact with Hartford. The other purposes of the Rule include a full and fair opportunity to resolve evidentiary issues pretrial and avoid the kind of prejudicial delay occasioned by the State's failure to disclose evidence in advance of trial. In this instance this issue would have been subject to motions in limine and potentially extended evidentiary hearings on the 404(b) issues. This did not occur precisely because the State failed to exercise due diligence. This has prejudiced Mr. DeMocker and his defense. For this reason, this evidence and these witnesses should be precluded.

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II. The Opening Statements Do Not Make the Issue of Mr. DeMocker's Disclaimer of the Hartford Insurance Benefits Relevant and Admissible

The State, in its opening statement, made the following statement:

"The evidence will show that at the time of her death, Carol Kennedy's death, her murder, that Steven DeMocker was the owner and beneficiary of two life insurance policies on the life of Carol Kennedy. The total value of those life insurance policies was \$750,000. One was \$500,000, the other was \$250,000. And the evidence will show that he made a claim for those benefits on August 20th of the year 2008."

The State knew that this recitation—that there would be evidence that Mr. DeMocker made a claim for \$750,000 on August 20, 2008—was designed to mislead the jury and if accepted would have caused the jury to accept as true a false understanding of the facts.. The State had in its possession an email from Steve DeMocker, dated September 3, 2008, to Hartford Life Insurance stating that "[t]o repeat the position I described to you when we first spoke on the phone, I do not wish to receive the death benefit from either policy. Instead, as you know, I'm trying to determine if there is a way to disclaim the proceeds to our daughters, or failing that, to determine the most tax-efficient way of gifting the money to them for their sole benefit." From the outset—well before he was charged, but after he knew he was a suspect—Mr. DeMocker was trying to find a way to make clear that he was NOT making a "claim for those benefits." That is precisely what he was telling the Hartford Insurance Company on August 20, 2008.

The State has had this email since November of 2008. The statement that Mr. DeMocker had made a claim for these benefits, without mention of this email or the facts therein, was false and misleading.

Mr. Sears' response--in the defense Opening Statement--that Mr.

DeMocker had disclaimed his interest in the Hartford policies and the benefits

had been paid to his daughters was both factually correct and a necessary correction of the account given by the State to the jury.

The Court has asked whether the defense Opening might have left open the question of what Mr. DeMocker's disclaimer meant, given that his daughters ultimately used some of their insurance money to defray their father's defense costs. Leaving aside the arguments above, the issue of the disclaimer was necessarily raised by the State when it misrepresented the known facts to the jury. Mr. Sears' response was simply clarifying what the State knew to be true all along in this case, that Mr. DeMocker sought a way to disclaim the proceeds to his daughters. As outlined above, what Mr. DeMocker's daughters did with their money is not relevant. The meaning of the disclaimer, that Hartford Insurance Company then distributed the funds to Mr. DeMocker's daughters where they would not previously distribute the proceeds, is also not relevant. The only relevance of what happened to the Hartford Insurance policies after Carol Kennedy's death was to clarify the State's misstatement to the jury that Mr. DeMocker made a claim for the insurance proceeds as if that were the whole story. The State should not now benefit from its misstatement. This issue is not relevant and the opening statements do not make the meaning of the disclaimer relevant to the issues in this trial.

III. Possible Stipulation to Address the Court's Concern About Mr. DeMocker's Disclaimer of Hartford Insurance Benefits

Given what we have said in our pleadings and in the sealed proceeding yesterday, there should be no further testimony permitted on this topic. If, however, the Court should conclude, over counsels' objections, that the meaning of what Mr. DeMocker's "disclaimer" of Hartford Insurance benefits means is relevant and admissible, counsel provides the following suggestion.

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403 implications while providing the jury with the information the State wants to put in front of the jury.

The risk of permitting the State to go beyond this stipulation and proposed orders is obvious from the State's July 12, 2010 under seal filing on the Determination of Counsel. The State would intend, if allowed, to accuse the Defendant and his lawyers of "fraud," "theft," "breach of fiduciary duty," and "money laundering." The State would also—we now know clearly from the statements in Court on July 14—like to argue that the payments of money for Mr. DeMocker's defense is somehow proof that he intended to kill Carol Kennedy to get these insurance proceeds.

If permitted, the State has now left no doubt but that it will argue that it may tell the jury that Mr. DeMocker, aided by his lawyers, "looted" the estate of Carol Kennedy, that they did so with the complicit aid of his daughters, Renee Girard, his parents, and almost anyone else who might be heard to speak favorably of Steve DeMocker. The State demonstrated as much at the hearing on July 14. The State made the following accusations at that hearing, "[a]nd yet he [Mr. DeMocker] manages to manipulate, with some assistance from counsel, where he gets the payments of those proceeds. They are - \$700,000 of those proceeds are paid for his benefit. And he's got this plan in place, and he's made his lawyers a part of his plan." (Page 25:23-26:3) Further, "[t]he State maintains that he had that plan in place before that [the murder]. And we believe that there will be evidence in trial that demonstrates that this is just a continuation of his plan to murder Carol Kennedy, get payment of her insurance proceeds, get ride of her alimony problems, etc. And he manipulates his counsel into assisting him to get those proceeds." (page 26: 7-13). And on and on, "[a]nd then on top of that, on the same day he signs the resignation of Katherine DeMocker document and acceptance by Renee Girard – that is July 10 of 2009 – on that same day he signs it because Mr. Sears presents it to him that day, that's the day he's in here with counsel on an ex parte

hearing to determine his indigency. And that day is the day that his indigency is determined. And shortly thereafter Yavapai County steps up to the plate and starts paying apparently huge bills for Mr. DeMocker' case. Even though he and his counsel are knowing at that point in time that he's going to be receiving \$700,000 in life insurance proceeds through a shell game" (26:14-27:4). And even further inflammatory "[t]hough a shell game maneuvering through accounts to get paid back to counsel John Sears and Osborn Maledon." (27:4-6). "And in this particular case, defense counsel have, basically, gotten in bed with Mr. DeMocker and helped him do what he had set out to do prior to the time of the homicide. Now I'm not saying that they intentionally did that. They were manipulated into doing that. And I think that they had blinders on." The State should not be permitted to make theses unsupported, inflammatory allegations part of this trial.

CONCLUSION

Defendant Steven DeMocker, by and through counsel, hereby requests that this Court prohibit the State from offering testimony from the late disclosed witnesses or from introducing late disclosed evidence or any argument based thereon related to the Hartford Insurance policy payouts, but if there is to be any statement made to this jury it should go no farther than the single sentence proposed in this pleading.

DATED this | day of July, 2010.

By:

John M. Sears P.O. Box 4080

Prescott, Arizona 86302

OSBORN MALEDON, P.A. Larry A. Hammond Anne M. Chapman 2929 N. Central Avenue, Suite 2100

ORIGINAL of the foregoing hand delivered for filing this 15 day of July, 2010, with: Jeanne Hicks Clerk of the Court Yavapai County Superior Court 120 S. Cortez Prescott, AZ 86303 COPIES of the foregoing hand delivered this this 16 day of July, 2010, to: The Hon. Warren R. Darrow Judge Pro Tem B 120 S. Cortez Prescott, AZ 86303 Joseph C. Butner, Esq. Jeffrey Paupore, Esq. Prescott Courthouse basket

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